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A Look Back on the Year After Our Founding  
Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI (RECNA Director)  
A year and a half has already 
passed since RECNA was estab-
lished. The memory of our scram-
ble to monitor the Preparatory 
Committee for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 
Conference in Vienna a mere 
month after the center’s establish-
ment is still fresh in our minds, but 
this year’s monitoring of the 2nd 
Preparatory Committee (Geneva) 
is already over. RECNA has come 
full circle at full speed, and per-
haps we have gotten somewhat of 
a grasp on the pace. 
 
The total abolition of nuclear weapons is an acutely urgent issue for 
humankind and a theme that is constantly in motion. From its estab-
lishment, RECNA has been questioning how to sort out this wide-
ranging problem and draft effective action plans with limited re-
sources. In the end, we organized the current issues into the following 
4 main elements. 
 (1) Develop infrastructure for factual information → Construct a   
 database for citizens 
 (2) Track global nuclear disarmament/non-proliferation inter- 
  governmental forums 
  (3) Conduct research projects contributing to the achievement and  
  maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons → Nuclear  
  Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ) 
 (4) Develop new leaders, particularly students, dedicated to nucle 
  ar disarmament efforts 
RECNA has held repeated discussions on how to tackle the serious 
issues related to the history of Nagasaki’s bombing (the history up to 
the atomic bombing, collecting facts about after the atomic bombing, 
investigations and research on hibakusha, etc.). As can be gleaned 
from the above 4 main elements, we have charted a course for the 
present that focuses on investigation and research for the purpose of 
achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, within 
activities related to the 4 main elements, we should utilize knowledge 
accumulated that is based on the history and experience of the Naga-
saki bombing, and should remain committed to those concerns. New 
involvements may arise from that process. 
 
What follows are thoughts on future issues and an overview of the 
year’s progress in terms of the 4 main elements. 
 
(1) Develop infrastructure for factual information 
Considering the fact that the theme of the abolition of nuclear weap-
ons has an interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral character, we aimed to 
build a factual foundation as an online citizens’ database that can be 
utilized by people from many disciplines. The first development plan 
was drawn up and executed in this first year. To create a database on 
nuclear weapons, we also gained the participation of non-RECNA 
researchers to organize the “Nuclear Warhead Data Tracking Team.” 
In general, the undertaking proceeded smoothly, but the important 
issue of establishing a translation system for new international docu-
ments has surfaced. Currently, priority is being given to the online 
communication of document outlines, even if a translation has not 
been closely scrutinized. 
 
(2) Track global nuclear disarmament/non-proliferation inter-
governmental forums 
This activity is critical both because of its necessity to our own re-
search activities and because it contributes to capacity building for 
citizens and students by conveying information in real time. First, 
daily reports were communicated through blogs and monitoring of 
the 1st Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference 
held in Vienna from April to May 2012. The same activities were also 
conducted for the 2nd Preparatory Committee that took place in Ge-
neva in 2013. If diplomatic consultations and discussions toward the 
abolition of nuclear weapons intensify, then simply following the 
meetings in relation to the NPT will be inadequate. There will likely 
be an even greater need to monitor other meetings such as the UN 
General Assembly First Committee and the open-ended working 
group (OEWG) meetings inaugurated in May 2013, for which, regret-
tably, we could not send our staff. 
 
(3) Research Project: “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a 
NEA-NWFZ” 
To reinforce the momentum of the paradigm shift toward surpassing 
nuclear deterrent theory to a world free from nuclear weapons, glob-
al attention is turning to issues including (1) legal frameworks for a 
ban on nuclear arms, (2) newly establishing and strengthening Nucle-
ar Weapon Free Zones, and (3) approaches to nuclear disarmament 
that focus on international humanitarian law. While paying close 
attention to these trends, RECNA has concentrated on research that 
will contribute to policy change in Japan, a nation that has experi-
enced nuclear bombing. That is the research project with the title of 
this Section. Utilizing the new proposal on a Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone in Northeast Asia (late 2011) presented by Dr. Morton Halperin 
(former Special Assistant to President Clinton), we took important 
first steps that included holding an international workshop that invit-
ed 7 overseas guests, including Dr. Halperin (December 2012). In 
addition, we had the second international workshop held in Seoul in 
June 2013 which was co-organized by Center for Peace and Public 
Integrity of Hanshin University in Seoul. 
 
(4) Develop new leaders, particularly students 
Nurturing young leaders is crucial to the achievement and mainte-
nance of a world free from nuclear weapons and requires a double 
approach of shaping basic understanding through university lectures 
and seminars, and creating proactive and responsible individuals 
through exchange with international and local communities. As for 
the former, a module class entitled “Toward a World Free from Nucle-
ar Weapons” was started. Initiatives to foster student activities have 
been launched through the creation in October of the consultative 
body, “PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,” which 
was organized among the Nagasaki Prefecture, Nagasaki City, and 
Nagasaki University. From that, the “Nagasaki Youth Delegation” was 
                                                                                                                                RECNA Newsletter Vo.2 No.2 February  2014 1 
(Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI , 
RECNA Director)  
initiated to participate in the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the 
NPT Review Conference (Geneva). Ensuring the drive and endurance 
of the students is an important issue for the future. 
 
The above was a look back on RECNA’s main activities, but there were 
many more, and it is impossible to note them all here. We are also keenly 
aware of having received support from many people who fill us with their 
sense of solidarity. At this stage, everything lies in the future, but it has 
been an extremely full first year that bodes well for further development. 
(June 30, 2013) 
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2nd Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference: Mounting Issues & Faint Hopes 
Satoshi HIROSE (RECNA Vice Director) 
Keiko NAKAMURA (RECNA Associate Professor)  
The 2nd Preparatory Com-
mittee for the Nuclear Non
-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) Review Conference, 
scheduled to be held in 
New York in 2015, took 
place in Geneva, Switzer-
land at the United Nations 
Office at Geneva over two 
weeks from April 22nd to 
May 2nd. Following REC-
NA’s monitoring of the 1st 
Preparatory Committee 
held in Vienna last year, 
staff members, we stayed 
in Geneva to monitor the 
Preparatory Committee 
during the entire period it 
was in session. (Details can 
be found in the 2013 NPT BLOG on the RECNA website: 
www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/nptblog/npt2013/. The 11 instances of 
on-site reporting from The Nagasaki Shimbun appearing April 24th–
May 6th are also available.) 
 
This Preparatory Committee garnered international interest prior to 
the meeting over what stance the various nations would take toward 
the progress of the international conference on a Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) Free Zone in the Middle East scheduled for De-
cember in 2013 that was suddenly postponed, and discussions on the 
growing global concern over the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons, including a joint statement prepared among some nations 
at the 1st Preparatory Committee and The First Committee of the UN 
General Assembly in 2013, and the international conference held in 
March 2014 in Oslo, Norway. In addition to these two issues, the actu-
al Preparatory Committee saw particularly vigorous exchanges of 
opinions on the peaceful utilization and development of nuclear ener-
gy, and the ideal state of the Preparatory Committee. However, here 
we would like to touch on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear 
weapons that is directly relevant to nuclear disarmament and devel-
opments involving the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East.  
 
The “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weap-
ons” (a full Japanese translation is uploaded to the NPT BLOG) was 
delivered by South Africa, representing the signatory nations, on the 
last day of the general debate, April 24th. It was the content that first 
attracted attention. While the statements released twice last year 
(“Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Dis-
armament”) contained nearly identical content, this joint statement 
included significant changes to the content, as can be discerned by 
the change in title. Most important is the elimination of the wording, 
“outlaw” nuclear weapons. While many countries, including Japan, 
oppose linking the focus on inhumanity to arguments on nuclear 
weapon convention, this statement focuses solely on the 
“catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of nuclear weapons, thus 
earning the support of different nations in what can be called an at-
tempt to broaden international common understanding. The same 
strategy was also taken at the Oslo Conference (Conference on the 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons) last March. Clarifying the 
goal of sharing scientific knowledge on the humanitarian consequenc-
es of using nuclear weapons succeeded in garnering the participation 
of 127 countries. 
 
There were 74 countries that agreed with the joint statement at the 
time of its announcement, but ultimately that number grew to 80. 
Compared to the 16 countries at the 1st Preparatory Committee last 
year and the 34 countries (plus the observer state, the Holy See) at 
the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, it is evident that 
that number dramatically increased. The fact that within the state-
ment many nations touched on the inhumanity of nuclear weapons, 
combined with the Oslo Conference, attest to the gathering momen-
tum of this movement in international discussions over nuclear dis-
armament, as stated by the South African representative on the last 
day when he said, “[The catastrophic consequences of the use of nu-
clear weapons] has established a firm presence in the international 
agenda.” On the other hand, very little progress was seen in terms of 
support from countries that rely on nuclear deterrence, such as Japan, 
Australia, South Korea, and NATO nations (the 3 countries of Norway, 
Denmark, and Iceland supported), so that it may well be that this 
statement was regarded as a “target.” It also served as a reminder of 
how high the “wall” of obstruction stands.  
 
Japan, which did not sign the last two joint statements, also declined 
on this occasion due to the 3 words, “under any circumstances” that 
appear in the sentence, “It is in the interest of the very survival of 
humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any cir-
cumstances.” It was said that up until the very end negotiations con-
tinued with South Africa and other nations over the deletion of that 
phrase.  
 
The Japanese government talked about that reason on the 25th, the 
day after the joint statement was delivered, saying that while Japan 
“shares concerns about the humanitarian impact caused by the use of 
nuclear weapons,” Japan “carefully and earnestly examined the com-
patibility (of the joint statement)” while “taking into account the se-
curity environment surrounding Japan.” The Japanese government 
held discussions over revising the joint proposal, but with no result, 
and took a wait-and-see attitude. The mention of “immediate dam-
age” in addition to “unbearable socioeconomic and cross-generational 
losses brought about by nuclear weapon use,” and the statement that, 
“Japan wishes to explore seriously the possibility of joining the state-
ment with the same theme in the future,” should likely be given a 
measure of approval. However, it goes without saying that the issue is 
not whether the statement would be acceptable if the 3 words were 
deleted, but we must recognize the magnitude of the fact that Japan, 
which is a country that has experienced atomic bombings, once again 
sent the wrong message to the world that “nuclear weapons have a 
role.” 
 
In regard to promoting the establishment of a WMD-Free Zone in the 
Middle East, which was decided at the Review and Extension Confer-
ence of the of the NPT in 1995, together with the “Principles and Ob-
jectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” and 
strengthening of the treaty review process  as conditions of the mate-
rially indefinite extension of the NPT. This decision was reconfirmed 
at the 2000 Review Conference. At the 2010 Review Conference, 
more specific decisions were made to appoint a facilitator (role of 
(Amb.  Laajava, a facilitator for the Con-
ference on WMD-Free Zone in the Mid-
dle East, consulting with Ms. Kane, UN 
High Representative for Disarmament at 
the 2nd PrepCom in Geneve, May 2013)  
 
mediator) to be in charge of conference preparations, and that the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations together with the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Russia would convene an internation-
al conference in 2012 on the establishment of a WMD-Free Zone in the 
Middle East in which all countries in the Middle East would partici-
pate. 
 
Based on these 2010 decisions, in 2011the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Russia and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
which were tasked to convene the international conference, appoint-
ed Finland’s Under-Secretary of State, Jaakko Laajava as a facilitator. It 
was also decided that the conference would take place in Finland. 
Looking toward the conference, Under-Secretary of State Laajava 
energetically continued discussions with relevant nations and inter-
national organizations and he received an enthusiastic response from 
the majority of countries at the 1st Preparatory Committee held in 
Vienna. Based on the 2010 agreement, a presentation was made indi-
cating the intention to hold an international conference on a WMD-
Free Zone in the Middle East at Helsinki in December 2012, and ap-
proval was gained. Then, Under-Secretary Laajava and his staff contin-
ued discussions with various relevant countries, but in the end, just 
before it was to be held, he concluded that since a certain country in 
the Middle East disagreed on participation and it was not possible by 
the deadline to fulfill the condition that “all countries in the Middle 
East participate.” Consequently, the plan for 2012 conference was 
abandoned, and apparently Under-Secretary Laajava notified only 
limited number of the relevant parties in advance that the conference 
would be postponed. 
 
At the 2nd Preparatory Committee, many countries one after another 
expressed critical opinions over this development, particularly the 
Middle Eastern and non-aligned countries. The majority of criticism 
was aimed at the facilitator’s approach of unilaterally deciding on, and 
giving notice of postponement without prior discussion with some 
major relevant parties including Russia. The United States and rele-
vant countries that displayed a supportive attitude for Israel, which 
refused to attend an international conference on establishing a WMD-
Free Zone in the Middle East and was the only country in the Middle 
East not included in the NPT were also criticized. And the third criti-
cism targeted the lack of progress in the process for establishing a 
WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, which had been agreed upon as a 
condition of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT. Though these 
criticisms are all valid and fact-based, actually resolving these issues 
in a short period is nearly impossible. For the Middle East to be a 
WMD-Free Zone, it must be premised on the establishment of an in-
ternational security system that can be trusted by all Middle Eastern 
nations, including Israel. However, that cannot be expected to be 
achieved at the present when diplomatic relations between Israel and 
Arab nations do not even exist. 
 
On the other hand, putting off the issues over a WMD-Free Zone in the 
Middle East is liable to cause a serious situation in the credibility of 
the NPT structure itself, as illustrated by Egypt’s boycott of the 2nd 
Preparatory Committee in the midst of it. As a way to proceed with 
future endeavors, Under-Secretary Laajava hopes to shift the spotlight 
from the two-nation discussions that have been the focus to multilat-
eral discussions and stress the securement of transparency among 
relevant countries to gain the understanding of all countries. Howev-
er, will that really lead to understanding from Middle Eastern coun-
tries? It must be said that the situation is extremely difficult.  
 
Looking at the outcomes of the 2nd Preparatory Committee, overall it 
appears that progress toward the 2015 Review Conference is insuffi-
cient, but with less than 2 years remaining until the Review Confer-
ence, the Preparatory Committee has only one meeting left. We hope 
for further progress toward resolving outstanding issues by the time 
the Review Conference is held.  
Unification at the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Workshop in Seoul & the United Nations Open-ended Working Group 
Hiromichi Umebayashi (RECNA Director) 
The “OEWG (open-ended working group) to develop proposals to 
take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the 
achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weap-
ons” (hereafter, UN OEWG) was established in accordance with the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (67/56), “Taking for-
ward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations*1” that was 
adopted in December last year. It is a resolution led by Australia, 
Mexico, and Norway to overcome stagnation in the movement to-
ward a world without nuclear weapons. The substantive discussions 
of the UN OEWG took place at the United Nations Office at Geneva 
(Geneva) during the May session (14th–24th) and August session 
(19th–30th). On August 30th, a report by the UN OEWG was adopted 
for the autumn U. N. General Assembly. It was a groundbreaking new 
movement in the field of nuclear disarmament. 
 
In the midst of that, the 2nd workshop for RECNA’s project, 
“Developing a Comprehensive Approach to NEA-NWFZ” was held 
from June 20th–22nd at the central venue of Hanshin University in 
Seoul. Conscious of the 20th anniversary of the armistice agreement 
for the Korean War that fell on July 27th, the workshop was titled, 
“Envisioning Peace and Security in Northeast Asia.” The principal 
joint researchers for the project, Dr. Morton Halperin and Dr. Peter 
Hayes also participated in the Seoul workshop after having taken 
part in the 1st workshop last December at Nagasaki University. 
 
Ambassador Enkhsaikhan from Mongolia, who was not available to 
the workshop in Nagasaki last year, could take part in this Seoul 
workshop. He is now affiliated to a Mongolian NGO “Blue Banner” 
that has close working relationship with Mongolian government, and 
his participation in the project has a great significance. 
 
As was stressed at the Nagasaki workshop and the Seoul workshop, 
the major reason why RECNA is tackling this research project is be-
cause the efforts to establish a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in North-
east Asia touch on the essence of, and constitute the effective and 
feasible first step for, the two main goals; active contribution to glob-
al nuclear disarmament and the creation of a system for easing ten-
sions and maintaining peace in Northeast Asia. The Seoul workshop 
aimed to share such concepts further in South Korea and to create 
ongoing cooperative relationships with Japanese and Korean re-
searchers, and civil society to develop approaches for achieving the 
concepts. In actuality, in-depth collaboration between RECNA and 
Korean researchers has only just begun. 
 
At that time, the OEWG report*2 adopted on August 30th gave us 
great courage. The first-line, international argument for pursuing the 
achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons 
was shown to precisely overlap with our awareness of issues being 
pursued in Northeast Asia. When attempting to develop regional 
collaboration at the researcher level, the sharing of this kind of global 
argument and its significance will surely become a great strength. 
 
NPT nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, France, China, 
and Britain) boycotted this UN OEWG. However, it would be a mis-
take if non-nuclear-weapon states advance a one-sided argument 
without the participation of nuclear-weapon states. The boycott by 
the nuclear-weapon states indicates an important aspect of the stale-
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2013 Nagasaki Peace Declaration* The Frustrations of Nagasaki, a Victim of the Atomic Bomb  
Satoshi HIROSE (RECNA Vice Director) 
Perhaps there were many 
people who felt the con-
tent of the Nagasaki Peace 
Declaration of 2013 was 
specific and bold. What 
particularly drew atten-
tion was the fact that it 
strongly criticized  the 
Japanese government’s 
decision not to agree the 
joint statement on the 
inhumanity of nuclear 
weapons at the Preparato-
ry Committee for the NPT 
Review Conference in 
2013, just like at the Pre-
paratory Committee and 
the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 2012, as 
well as the fact that there was a clear opposition to the government 
policy on promoting talks for concluding an nuclear cooperation 
agreement between Japan and India. In addition, the declaration 
showed an outright concern over the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 
nuclear power plant. 
 
Japan, which is the only country to have been bombed, has yet to 
indicate a clear posture of agreement with discussions involving the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that are quickly gaining 
support in the international community. The reason is the “bread-and
-butter theory” that the nuclear umbrella cast by the U.S.-Japan Secu-
rity Treaty is effective and necessary against real threats from nucle-
ar weapons in nearby nations. The argument written in the joint 
statement submitted at the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Re-
view Conference last year that “nuclear weapons are never used 
again, under any circumstances” was a renouncement of retaliation 
with nuclear weapons against nuclear attack by an enemy, and its 
incompatibility with the existing nuclear deterrent strategy was 
Japan’s reason for not supporting the joint statement. However, 
whether it is retaliation or not, in reality the use of nuclear weapons 
leads to consequences that directly and indirectly cause lethal and 
profound injury to many people without discrimination. It is precisely 
because Nagasaki has been the victim of an atomic bomb that this 
declaration is full of vexation toward the Japanese government’s 
stance of constantly trying to stress the necessity of nuclear weapons 
without looking squarely at the dire consequences. When the nuclear 
deterrent strategy which Japanese government is attempting to justi-
fy from the perspective of the security of state is put into action, from 
the standpoint of the citizens who are sacrificed, “humanity” is an 
assertion that attempts to declare dissent against the gravity of the 
consequences, not the justification of that strategy.*1 
 
In regard to talks on a nuclear cooperation agreement between Japan 
and India, no doubt the precedent of the negotiations on a nuclear 
cooperation agreement between the United States and India will be 
useful. In the United States, the jury is still out over the nuclear coop-
eration agreement with India. Not only that, but critics say there is a 
considerable difference between India and the United States over the 
interpretation of the agreement. Even if countries such as India that 
refuse to join the NPT and continue with development of nuclear 
weapons restricted their use to peaceful means, would the attempt to 
promote cooperation in the nuclear energy field bring a positive out-
come to the abolition of nuclear weapons? Moreover, if the Japan-
India nuclear cooperation agreement is concluded and hypothetically 
speaking in the future some country tries to conclude the same agree-
ment with North Korea and existing sanctions are lifted by the UN 
Security Council, on what grounds could Japan protest? It is only nat-
ural that questions are raised against the promotion of talks without 
first solving these kinds of various issues. There are probably many 
citizens concerned over the rush to negotiations with India through 
hasty judgment out of pursuit for economic gains. 
 
Victims of the atomic bombing are aging and many have already 
passed away. As was stated in the declaration, we are the last genera-
tion to hear the voices of the atomic bomb victims firsthand. It is un-
acceptable that the memories of the horrors of the atomic bomb fade 
with time, but the fading of memories is undeniable. When humans 
forget the mistakes of the past, they repeat them. Before it is too late, 
we must expedite the total abolition of nuclear weapons. This year’s 
declaration overflows with that frustration. 
 
* Refer to the translations of the Nagasaki Peace Declaration available 
in English, French, Chinese, Korean, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, 




*1 The Japanese government agreed with the joint statement on the 
inhumanity of nuclear weapons for the first time during The First 
Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2013. 
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mate in nuclear disarmament talks, and the participants earnestly 
debated how to break the deadlock in current conditions based on 
this reality. In the OEWG, NGOs also were able to participate in dis-
cussions on equal footing with state representatives. Through the 
submission of proposals for which there is not always agreement 
among them, NGOs made extensive and sincere efforts to enable the 
conference to fulfil the task of breaking the deadlock. 
 
As a result, we would like to point out that the OEWG report includes 
content believed to demarcate a new dimension in multilateral con-
ferences on nuclear disarmament. It should be recognized as a signifi-
cant contribution by OEWG. Until now, while basing arguments on 
Article 6 of the NPT, nuclear disarmament efforts have emphasized 
that all countries should be obliged to undertake the endeavor, not 
just nuclear-weapon states. This emphasis meant that nuclear dis-
armament penalized the tendency to make it a problem of countries 
that possess them. While this report is premised on that, it sets down 
a new, clear message that “States have differentiated roles and func-
tions” (Section 41). In particular, it notes that, “non-nuclear-weapon 
States have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament” (Section 
42). Furthermore, in regard to “the role of non-nuclear-weapon States 
under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees” such as Japan, it 
points out their role “in challenging the status and attached to nuclear 
weapons” (Section 44). 
 
Japan and Korea’s adoption of policies for establishing a Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia perfectly conforms to the argu-
ments given by the UN OEWG, because it means the shift by non-
nuclear-weapon states away from the present policy of assigning 
status and value to nuclear weapons while moving toward a new 
cooperative security. The Japanese government’s stance that “nuclear 
umbrella” policies and “nuclear disarmament” policies do not conflict 
will become more and more disparate with the explicit messages 
being sent by international conferences (written September 16th). 
 
*1 The English text and Japanese translation are in the RECNA citi-
zen’s database. 
*2 An advance copy of the entire text (English) dated September 3rd 
distributed prior to the United Nations General Assembly and a Japa-
nese translation of the main sections are in the RECNA citizen’s data-
base. 
(A panel placed at the main gate of  Naga-
saki University, explaining the damage 
inflicted by the A-bomb on the Ohashi 
Branch of Nagasaki Mitsubishi Armory, 
which is now a part of campus of Nagasaki 
University) 
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